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Abstract 
Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) play a critical role in shaping and applying the regulation 
applicable to online media expression within the European Economic Area.  Drawing on seven 
ubiquitous types of online new media actors, a comprehensive survey of these authorities was 
undertaken.  Tallying with its strong symbolic importance in Europe, this research found that 
European DPAs generally adopt an expansive interpretation of data protection and constrained 
understanding of freedom of expression in this space.  In contrast, data protection enforcement has 
been weak and lacking in harmonization.  Except for street mapping services, each type of online 
media actor had only faced relevant enforcement action from a minority of these agencies.  DPA 
financial resourcing is very limited.  Notwithstanding the development of DPA ʻnetwork governanceʼ 
through the Article 29 Working Party, only DPAs with a particularly extensive interpretative stance 
proved likely to have engaged in extensive enforcement activity. It remains unclear what difference 
the General Data Protection Regulation will make to resolving this enforcement gap and its related 
problems. 
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 Although still sometimes unfairly dismissed as “marginal”,2 European data protection centred 
on Data Protection Directive 95/46 (herein Directive 95/46)
3
 has emerged as “the central field for the 
development of privacy law and policy”.4  Moreover, whilst it can be seen as heralding a “remarkable 
expansion in human rights”,5 the substantive framework established by the Directive 95/46 sits in 
strong tension with the freedom to impart information especially through new, online media.  Google 
Spain dramatically highlighted this tension in the area of search engine indexing.
6
  However, it arises 
similarly across an ever more variegated and important new or online media landscape from blogging 
to social networking to street mapping.   Directive 95/46 additionally “mandated the creation of 
powerful national independent regulatory authorities – data privacy [or data protection] authorities – 
that monitor and enforce these rules”7 across the European Economic Area (EEA).8   As the EU 
Agency for Fundamental Rights has emphasised, these agencies are “the main actors protecting data 
protection rights, [and] play a crucial role in processing the overwhelming majority of data protection 
complaints”.9  In light of the critical role of the DPAs and the increasing centrality of online media 
activity, this article presents research on the interpretative stance, enforcement efforts and 
enforcement capacity of these agencies in this ever more ubiquitous area.  It principally draws on the 
results of a 2013 survey which secured unprecedented access to these regulators; in sum, twenty five, 
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that is approximately 80%, of national EEA DPAs participated, together with a further six operating at 
the regional level.
10
 
The survey results demonstrated that European DPAs overwhelmingly hold data protection 
norms to be strongly engaged across the online media space.  Such an onerous interpretative stance 
reflects the symbolic centrality of data protection within the now maturing area of EU fundamental 
rights coupled with the role DPAs play as “the guardians”11 of this framework, both nationally12 and 
in the pan-European Article 29 Working Party.
13
  In contrast, as will be explored below, enforcement 
has been both weak and lacking in harmonization.  Whilst the generally low level of enforcement may 
be linked to the meagre financial resources of the DPAs, divergences between them relate rather to 
continuing disparities in their interpretative stance.  Only DPAs with an unusually strong ideological 
commitment to data protection proved likely to have engaged in extensive enforcement activity, a fact 
which may be related to the risks this entails in terms of potentially taking on powerful interests such 
as Google or Facebook and garnering negative publicity.  A focus in some of the literature on often 
largely paper-based processes of “networked governance”14 within the Working Party may, therefore, 
overemphasise the level of practical effectiveness and harmonization that this regime has achieved.  
Whilst the General Data Protection Regulation recognises some of these challenges, it is unclear how 
effective the reforms it stipulates will prove in practice. 
The rest of this article is structured as follows.  The first section briefly introduces the 
essential legal context including the default structure and substance of Directive 95/46, the original 
debate on its interface with public freedom of expression and the evolution of thinking on this issue 
consequent to the seminal case of Lindqvist.
15
  The next then reviews the existing literature and 
outlines the specific research questions posed, and the methodology adopted, in this study.  The 
following two sections present and then analyse the general pattern of results.  The article then turns 
                                                          
10
 The survey entitled ʻDPA Survey on Data Protection and the Open Societyʼ was carried out by myself and 
made possible as a result of funding from the British Academy. 
11
 Commission v Germany (C-518/07) EU:C:2010:125 at [23]. 
12
 Directive 95/46, art. 28. 
13
 Directive 95/46, art. 29. 
14
 Newman, op. cit., n. 5, p. 182. 
15
 Lindqvist, Criminal Proceedings Against Bodil (C-101-01), EU:C:2003:596. 
4 
 
to explore the significant differences between the different jurisdictions as regards DPA enforcement, 
focusing on whether these might be explained by divergences in the level of financial resourcing of 
these agencies and/or by variation in the stringency of their interpretative stance.  The penultimate 
section explores the future shape of European data protection here, whilst the final one offers some 
brief conclusions. 
 
THE LEGAL AND POLICY CONTEXT  
1.  The general Data Protection framework 
Since the inception of data protection consequent to the development of computerized 
information and communication technology, Europe has played a groundbreaking role in 
championing its importance as an issue of fundamental rights.   A Council of Europe Data Protection 
Convention was finalized as early as 1981
16
 and in 1995 the European Union agreed to a Data 
Protection Directive 95/46 designed to “give substance and amplify” the Convention’s provisions.17    
In 2000, data protection was also recognised alongside a traditional right to privacy as a distinct right 
within the new EU Charter.
18
  The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in December 2009, 
granted the Charter the same legal status as the EU Treaties.
19
  Uniquely, it also separately set out a 
right to data protection in the treaties themselves.
20
  
The material, purposive and substantive reach of European data protection as encapsulated in 
the framework Directive 95/46 are far-reaching.  Absent specific exemption under Article 3.2, its 
material scope encompasses the “processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means” as 
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well as in certain structured, manual filing systems.
21
  The key terms here are all defined broadly.  
“[P]ersonal data” refers to “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person 
(ʻdata subjectʼ)” and “processing … by automatic means” includes “any operation” performed 
digitally including consultation, dissemination and erasure.
22
 Meanwhile, its purpose is to “protect the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy”, while at 
the same time prohibiting restrictions on the free flow of such personal data within Europe for reasons 
connected with such protection.
23
   The Directive also stresses that the level of protection achieved 
must be both “equivalent”24 and “high”.25  Reflecting these wide and ambitious purposes, the default 
substance of the regime requires that all “controllers” – that is anybody “who alone or jointly with 
others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data”26 -  ensure that their 
data processing comply with an extensive set of data protection principles,
27
 detailed rules relating to 
data subject transparency
28
  and sensitive data
29
 and, finally, a range of data security and other control 
mechanisms designed to secure discipline in data processing.
30
   Turning to the Directive’s 
supervisory system, although a right to a judicial remedy
31
 and individual compensation
32
 must be 
made available, in reality “very few data protection cases are initiated”33 and courts play a “small 
role” in this area ).34 Instead, the central and “essential component”35 of this system rests on the 
establishment in each Member State of one or more independent DPAs which have a duty to monitor 
application of the law and hear claims by data subjects; in turn, they must also be endowed with wide-
ranging powers of investigation and intervention.
36
  Finally, representatives of these agencies must 
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cooperate together including in the pan-European Working Party
37
 which is charged with promoting 
“uniform application”38 of Directive 95/46 across the EEA.   The centrality of the DPAs is reflected in 
the fact that one of the few elements of the regime specifically elucidated in the EU Charter is that 
“[c]ompliance … shall be subject to control by an independent authority”.39 
 
2.  Freedom of Expression under Directive 95/46 
The exercise of freedom of expression undoubtedly has the potential to seriously and 
negatively impact on the privacy and other rights and freedoms which data protection is established to 
defend.  At the same time, the default data protection provisions outlined above also plainly have the 
potential to seriously interfere with free speech.  Clearly, therefore, the law should address the tension 
between these two sets of rights.  However, whilst the need for this was explicitly recognised in 
Article 9 of Directive 95/46, this was true only as regards processing “carried out solely for 
journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression”.  Moreover, even within this 
special purposes area, Member States were to provide for derogations “only if they are necessary to 
reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression”.  Recital 37 further 
clarified that there should be no qualification to the requirements of data security and “at least the 
supervisory authority responsible for this sector should … be provided with certain ex-post powers”.  
Although other parts of the Directive empowered Member States to adopt more limited derogations 
where “necessary … to safeguard … the rights and freedoms of others”,40 freedom of expression was 
rarely discussed in this context. 
Notwithstanding Article 9’s dichotomous conceptualization of this issue, the Lindqvist case 
highlighted early on in the Directive’s history that the relationship between data protection and 
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freedom of expression was more complex.  This case considered the potential data protection 
obligations arising from Mrs. Lindqvist’s publication on her personal internet site of “personal data of 
a number of people working with her on a voluntary basis in a parish of the Swedish Protestant 
Church”.41 Although Mrs. Lindqvist claimed that she was excluded from this law, the European Court 
of Justice strongly rejected this.  In particular, it held that Directive’s exception clause42 exempting 
activities ʻoutside the scope of Community lawʼ was limited to the “activities of the State or of State 
authorities”,43 whilst this clause’s similar exclusion of ʻpurely personal or household activityʼ 
“clearly” did not encompass “the processing of personal data consisting in publication on the internet 
so that those data are made accessible to an indefinite number of people”.44   The Court also refused to 
support the claim by the European Commission (which along with several Member States intervened 
in this case) that the website constituted “an artistic and literary creation within the meaning of Article 
9”.45   However, notwithstanding the United Kingdom’s oblique suggestion that general data 
protection provisions might legitimately apply in full here,
46
 it ultimately supported the proposition 
that “Mrs Lindqvist’s freedom of expression … [has] to be weighed against the protection of the 
private life of individuals about whom Mrs Lindqvist has placed data on her internet site” and that it 
was the responsibility of both “authorities and courts” to ensure that this happened.47 
Although certain aspects of the Lindqvist judgment, notably as regards the material scope of 
the Directive, were apparently peremptory, the various arguments raised in the case have remained 
live at a practical level.  In any case, similar disputes must be addressed not just in relation to amateur 
individual publication but as regards the whole range of online media expressive activity. 
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EXISTING LITERATURE, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODLOGY 
 The growing literature on the European data protection provides a good elucidation of the 
way in which it “relies on a network of national regulators embedded within a pan-European co-
operative structure to oversee and monitor data privacy rules”.48   It is, however, marked by strong 
disagreement as to the extent to which the goals of the regime have been achieved.  For example, 
whilst Newman states that “European integration efforts have clearly resulted in a significant 
convergence among national enforcement regimes”,49 Blume and Svanberg claim that “there can be 
little doubt that Directive 95/46 has not achieved real harmonisation”.50  Nevertheless, rather 
surprisingly given its growing importance and complexity, there is almost no work exploring at an 
empirical level the interface between this European data protection regime and online media 
expression. 
 This article seeks to address this lacunae by systematically analysing the interpretative stance, 
enforcement extent and enforcement capacity of DPAs in this area.  In doing so, it primarily draws on 
the results of a survey on these issues which was sent to both national and sub-national EEA DPAs,
51
  
initially in March 2013, with replies being received until the end of July 2013.
52
 Responses were 
forthcoming from 25 (over 80%) of national DPAs, together with a further six operating sub-
nationally.  This, therefore, provided a near comprehensive set of empirical data, providing a clear 
elucidation of the current data protection landscape for online media expression across Europe.  In 
addition, it was recognised that, as regards reported enforcement action, it would be both useful and 
practicable to engage in some cross-checking of the results against public domain material.  Using 
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language experts for the various jurisdictions, a review was therefore made of relevant material 
readily available on the websites of all the DPAs responding to the survey. 
Turning to the construction of the survey itself, ‘media expression’ was conceptualized to 
refer to mass communication or, in other words, forms of disseminating information to a potentially 
large and generally indefinite number of people.  Meanwhile, the reference to ʻnewʼ or ʻonlineʼ 
focused on “those methods and social practices of communication … that have developed using the 
digital, multimedia, networked computer and the ways in which this machine is held have transformed 
work in other media”.53 This definition was capacious enough to include both practices focused 
principally on the relatively static ʻweb pageʼ (e.g. blogging) and newer ʻWeb 2.0ʼ models which seek 
to capitalize even more explicitly on the internet’s network attributes, thereby enhancing the 
ʻspreadableʼ nature of online communication as well as the participative nature of its production (e.g. 
social networking).
54
 
 As regards the questions linked to the interpretative stance of the DPAs, the survey probed 
these agencies on their opinion as regards the following seven hypothetical scenarios, which were 
intentionally linked to seven types of online media actor which have become both well-established 
and ubiquitous: 
1. Newspaper archive - “A searchable online newspaper archive publishes a newspaper 
story originally published a decade ago concerning a living individual.”   
2. Individual blogger - “In his spare time, an individual publishes a blog that discusses 
and disseminates gossip about various celebrities. It is freely available on the Internet 
and visited by several hundred people a week.” 
3. Internet rating website - "A company establishes a website freely available on the 
Internet allowing individuals to 'rate' and add comments about their teachers."   
4. Individual on social networking site - “A member of a Social Networking Site (SNS), 
the membership of which is generally open to individuals worldwide, ʻtagsʼ a photo of an 
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identified individual and makes an informed decision to make this freely available to all 
members of the site.”  
5. Social networking site - “The Social Networking Site (SNS) is contacted directly by the 
same identified individual as above [i.e. the data subject mentioned in scenario 4 above] 
who claims that the Site itself is a Data Controller in relation to this processing.”  
6. Internet search engine - “A company provides a service allowing people to search the 
information sources of the public Internet (including on identified individuals) through a 
web-based search engine.”   
7. Street mapping service - “A street mapping service produces maps with street-level 
photographic images including pictures of individuals, motor vehicles and homes.” 
Although free-text responses were also permitted, DPAs were invited to indicate, in relation to each of 
the scenarios above, which one of these standardized statements was considered correct: 
a. Data protection does not apply. 
b. Data protection applies, but the activity in question must benefit from all the special 
derogations and exemptions for journalism, art and literature envisaged in Article 9 of 
Directive 95/46/EC. 
c. The general provisions of data protection apply, but must be interpreted with regard for 
other fundamental rights including freedom of expression. 
d. The general provisions of data protection law apply in full. 
These pre-formulated statements attempted to crystallize the four broad approaches to the interface 
between public expression and data protection which, as outlined above, were put before the Court of 
Justice in Lindqvist.  In essence, they represent ordered categories ranging from full exemption 
(option (a)) through to full application (option (d)) of the default data protection framework.  As a 
result, it is possible to translate the responses onto a quantitative scale ranging from 0 (no application) 
to 1 (full application) of data protection.
55
   
                                                          
55
 Here (a) is equal to 0, (b) to 0.33, (c) to 0.67 and (d) to 1. 
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 Turning to questions related to enforcement, the survey probed DPAs both on their 
enforcement activity, measured in terms of the extent of enforcement they had undertaken, and their 
enforcement capacity, measured in terms of the financial resources they had at their disposal.  As 
regards enforcement activity, DPAs were invited to indicate what action (if any) they had taken since 
the transposition of Directive 95/46 as regards various types of activity connected to publication 
carried out by each of the online media actors specified above.  Four responses were possible: 
a. A nil-return indicating that no enforcement action had been taken at all. 
b. An indication that action had been taken but only in relation to the use of material obtained 
without proper authorization from another data controller. 
c. An indication that action had been taken but only in relation to processing activity not related 
to material obtained without proper authorization from another data controller. 
d. An indication that action had been taken both in relation to the use of material obtained 
without proper authorization from another data controller and in relation to another type of 
processing activity. 
These four options also represent ordered categories measuring, in this case, the divergent extent of 
data protection enforcement.
56
  An outcome of no enforcement (option (a)) is obviously the least 
extensive.  Meanwhile, whilst option (b) signifies some action has been taken, this is expressly limited 
to the use of information obtained without permission from another controller.  This latter controller 
will likely be processing for purposes which would be undermined by publication (e.g. medical care 
in the case of, say, a doctor’s practice) and the unauthorized obtaining of the information will often 
require recourse to invidious mechanisms such as corruption or blagging.
57
 Therefore, enforcement in 
this context will in principle constitute less of a direct interference with exclusively new media 
publication than action in other contexts (option (c)) which will necessarily involve wider categories 
of information, most of which is likely either to have been obtained with consent (e.g. an interview 
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transcript) or to have been self-generated by the publisher themselves (e.g. a photographic image).  
Finally, taking action in both these contexts (option (d)) self-evidently constitutes the most extensive 
enforcement possible.  Given this, it is similarly possible to translate these responses on to a 0-1 
quantitative scale. 
 Turning lastly to the question of financial resourcing, DPAs were asked to specify their 
annual budget dedicated to data protection issues.  Where, as is regularly the case, part of the DPA’s 
budget was used to further other objectives such as freedom of information,
58
 DPAs were specifically 
invited to estimate that part of the budget allocated to data protection. 
 
STANDARDIZED RESULTS OF THE DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITY SURVEY 
 As noted above, some 31 DPAs responded to the survey, 25 of which operated at the national 
and 6 at the regional level.  However, as regards interpretative stance, the UK DPA declined to 
provide any answers, whilst the Netherlands DPA only provided an answer in relation to two out the 
seven actors.
59
   Moreover, approximately 10% of the other answers were received in non-
standardized free-text form.  These answers are excluded from the presentation of results in this 
section and the analysis in the next.  In contrast, later discussion focusing on divergences between 
different European jurisdictions as regards DPA enforcement utilizes quasi-standardized responses 
which were imputed in place of these free-text answers.  Further details on this are provided below. 
Turning to the enforcement dimension, a complete set of responses was received here, although two 
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 Such a merger of functions is a feature not only of Germanic and UK information law regulation but also of 
other jurisdictions including Hungary, Malta and Slovenia. 
59
 The UK DPA justified its non-response on the basis that it considered “it would be unhelpful to attempt to 
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answers were not the answer we would give”. 
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DPAs technically provided a response in their own words
60
 and two others provided some additional 
free-text specification.
61
 
 
1.   Interpretative Stance and Enforcement Extent 
 The tables overleaf set out general information on the standard responses received from DPAs 
in relation to their interpretative stance (Table One) and the extent of their enforcement action (Table 
Two).   In each case, both the percentage and total number of responses falling within each of the four 
standardized categories is specified, with the modal category are also highlighted in bold.  The last 
column then sets out an interpretation score and an enforcement score respectively.  These are 
computed from the average of the numeric version of all the categorical responses received in relation 
to each online media actor. The standard deviation of these responses is also calculated.  Finally, the 
last row provides combined information on the responses as regards all seven online media actors. 
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 In sum, the German federal DPA stated that it was “not competent in supervising data protection the private 
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DPA stated that its enforcement action against an individual on a social networking site was “in his/her capacity 
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Table One: Interpretative Stance vis-à-vis Online Media Expression – Standard DPA Responses 
Online Media Actor (n) Category  
a/0 
 
Exempt 
Category 
b/0.33 
 
Art. 9 Special 
Purposes 
Category 
c/0.67 
 
Regard for 
Expression 
Category 
d/1 
 
Full 
Application 
 
Interpretation 
Score 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
(1) Newspaper Archive 
(n=25) 
12% (3) 48% (12) 32% (8) 8% (2) 
 
0.45 (0.26) 
 
(2) Individual Blogger 
(n=25) 
12% (3) 24% (6) 60% (15) 4% (1) 0.52 (0.25) 
(3) Internet Rating 
Website (n=30) 
3% (1) 0% (0) 50% (15) 47% (14) 0.80 (0.22) 
(4) Individual on Social 
Networking Site  (n=25) 
16% (4) 4% (1) 32% (8) 48% (12) 0.71 (0.36) 
(5) Social Networking 
Site (n=26) 
0% (0) 4% (1) 23% (6) 73% (19) 0.89 (0.18) 
(6) Internet Search 
Engine (n=26) 
8% (2) 0% (0) 12% (3) 81% (21) 0.88 (0.28) 
(7) Street Mapping 
Service (n=29) 
0% (0) 0% (0) 7% (2) 93% (27) 0.98 (0.08) 
Average  7% 11% 31% 51% 0.75 (0.23) 
 
Table Two:  Enforcement vis-à-vis Online Media Expression:  Standard DPA Responses 
Online Media Actor   
(n = 31) 
Category  
a/0 
 
No 
Enforcement 
Category 
b/0.33 
 
Unauthorized 
Material Only 
Category 
c/0.67 
 
Other 
Material Only 
Category 
 d/1 
 
Unauthorized 
and Other 
Material 
Enforcement 
Score 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
(1) Newspaper Archive  58% (18) 
 
10% (3) 
 
13% (4) 
  
19% (6) 
 
0.31 (0.40) 
 
(2) Individual Blogger  52% (16) 
 
3% (1) 
 
26% (8) 
 
19% (6) 
 
0.38 (0.41) 
(3) Internet Rating 
Website 
 61% (19) 
 
3% (1) 
 
23% (7) 
  
13% (4) 
  
0.29 (0.39) 
(4) Individual on Social 
Networking Site 
58% (18) 
 
6% (2) 
 
23% (7) 
 
13% (4) 
 
0.30 (0.38) 
(5) Social Networking 
Site 
55% (17) 
 
3% (1) 
 
19% (6) 
 
23% (7) 
 
0.37 (0.43) 
 
(6) Internet Search 
Engine 
74% (23) 
 
6% (2) 
 
13% (4) 
 
6% (2) 
 
0.17 (0.32) 
(7) Street Mapping 
Service 
48% (15) 
 
6% (2) 
 
29% (9) 
 
16% (5) 
 
0.38 (0.40) 
Average 58% 5% 21% 16% 0.31(0.39) 
 
 Turning to the attempt to cross-check the data on enforcement with that readily available on 
DPA websites, it was found that the very different way in which regulators approached the issues of 
publicly reporting, retaining and collating information in this area made the collection of systematic 
and comparable datasets largely impossible.  In particular, it was clear that many DPAs only 
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publicized prominent as opposed to all examples of enforcement action and, in addition, only 
provided lists of such information from the past few years rather than since transposition of Directive 
95/46.
62
   In the case of street mapping services, however, it did prove possible to collate generally 
comprehensive information.  This reflected the fact that most enforcement here occurred in response 
to the roll-out across Europe of Google Street View (GSV) from 2008 onwards and was therefore 
both recent and had a relatively high-profile.  In this case, action taken against GSV as regards its 
illegal collection of information from private individual’s wi-fi connections was coded as enforcement 
in relation to the use of unauthorized material.  Conversely, action against GSV (or in a few cases 
other street mapping services) as regards the recording and/or use of photographic images was coded 
as enforcement concerning other material.  Even here, the complex manner in enforcement action 
against GSV was funnelled through the Hamburg DPA
63
 made coding impracticable in the case of the 
four German Länder survey respondents.
64
  The dataset from the remaining 26 DPA websites 
indicated that 11 DPAs (42%) had taken no enforcement action here at all (category a/0), 2 (8%) had 
taken enforcement action only in relation to unauthorized material, 8 DPAs (31%) had taken action 
only in relation to other material (category c/0.67) and finally 5 DPAs (19%) had taken action in both 
of these areas (category d/1).  The enforcement score here is 0.42 and the standard deviation 0.40.  As 
can be seen from the second to last row of Table Two above, these figures are extremely similar to the 
ones reported by the DPAs in this case.
65
 
                                                          
62
 This later reality was the case, for example, as regards the Estonian DPA’s website, which only provided a list 
of formal enforcement prescriptions from the past few years (Estonia, Eesti Andmekaitse Inspektsioon 
Ettekirjutused (2016) «http://www.aki.ee/et/menetluspraktika/ettekirjutused»). 
63
 The authority with jurisdiction for the region within which GSV’s German headquarters are located.  This 
DPA was not amongst the survey respondents. 
64
 It should also be noted that the Portuguese DPA kindly supplied documentation on formal action it had taken 
on 30 April 2013 against Google Street View.  Whilst this information was not found during the collection of 
data from the Portuguese DPA website, it was later published on this site.  It was, therefore, decided to take its 
contents into consideration when completing the public domain coding. 
65
 This dataset was also correlated at the level of individual result level with the DPA survey returns on street 
mapping service enforcement.  The Spearman’s rho here was 0.774with a two-tailed significance value of 0.00. 
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2.   Resourcing 
 DPAs provided information on their annual budgets in a variety of forms.  Although the great 
majority specified a figure in Euros, seven elected to respond using their local currency.
66
  Both the 
UK and Polish DPAs also explicitly indicated that their figure related to a year other than 2013 (the 
year of the survey).  It was, therefore, necessary to normalize these figures as best as possible.  This 
was achieved by using the average exchange rate for 2013 or, in the case of the UK and Poland, 2012 
and 2011 respectively (the nearest full calendar year to that specified by the DPA).
67
 The special 
situation in Germany and Spain also had to addressed.
68
  Uniquely, these countries divide both 
funding and regulatory responsibility for supervising data protection between the federal and 
Länder/regional DPAs.  In Germany the federal DPA is essentially responsible only for regulating the 
public sector, which is outside of the focus of this article, whilst the Länder DPAs regulate the private 
sector.  In contrast, in Spain regional DPAs in Catalonia and the Basque country regulate those 
entities operating under their region’s public law, whilst the Spanish federal DPA is responsible for 
regulation of all other private and public entities.  In the German case, given that responses were 
received from both the German federal DPA and four Länder DPAs, it was decided to drop separate 
consideration of the federal DPA and notionally reallocate a portion of the former’s budget to the four 
Länder jurisdictions pro-rated on the basis of their population size within Germany as of 2013.
69
  
Since the German federal DPA’s response had indicated no enforcement action as regards new media, 
the enforcement response from each German Land DPA in effect also represented the combined DPA 
enforcement efforts specific to that geographic jurisdiction.  In the case of Spain, given that no 
Spanish federal DPA response was received to sit alongside that of the Spanish Catalan DPA, it was 
considered best to drop the Spanish Catalonian jurisdiction from this part of the analysis as well as the 
                                                          
66
 In some cases, the Euro figure provided was only an approximate.  Where an exact local currency figure was 
also set out, this was generally preferred.  The only exception was Latvia as no Eurostat figure could be found 
for the required conversion. 
67
 Eurostat Euro/Ecu exchange rates – monthly data 
«http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ei_mfrt_m&lang=en 
68
 No issue arose in relation to Gibraltar since the regional DPA here is comprehensively responsible for 
regulating both the public and private sectors within this jurisdiction. 
69
 Germany, Statisches Bundesamt Regional Statistics in Brief 
«http://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/CountriesRegions/RegionalStatistics/RegionalStatistics.htm». 
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inter-jurisdictional investigations later in this article.
70
  Since the budget figures for all these 
jurisdictions were clearly strongly affected by the very divergent size of the residential population 
served by the various DPAs,
71
  these gross figures were additionally translated into per capita ones 
using population figures obtained from Eurostat,
72
 the Statisches Bundesamt
73
 and the Government of 
Gibraltar.
74
  Table Three below provides a cross-tabulation of reported DPA gross budgets (separated 
into a number of exponentially larger categories
75
) and per capita budgets (rounded to the nearest €0.1 
with the exception of the highest category (<€0.7) which comprises three outlier DPAs serving micro-
jurisdictions
76
).  Exact figures are set out in the appendix.  From this, it was calculated that the 
average gross reported budget was approximately €3.4M, whilst the median per capita budget was 
€0.33. 
                                                          
70
 For completeness, the Spain Catalan DPA reported a budget of approximately €2.8 million whilst the German 
federal DPA reported one of €8.5 million 
71
 Given the structure of data protection, DPAs are in theory responsible for supervising the processing of any 
personal data subject to their jurisdiction “whatever the nationality or residence of [the] natural persons” (recital 
3, Directive 95/46).  Given the nature of the internet, this could easily make a DPA even in a small jurisdiction 
responsible for data relating to hundreds of millions of individuals.  In practice, however, DPAs have not 
applied this logic.  For example, in its response to Google Spain, although acknowledging that “[u]nder EU law, 
everyone has the right to data protection” the Article 29 Working Party stated that “[i]n practice, DPAs will 
focus on claims where there is a clear link between the data subject and the EU, for instance where the data 
subject is a citizen or resident of an EU Member State”. Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on the 
Implementation of the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc v Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González” C-131/12 (2014), 3 
«http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf». 
72
 Eurostat Population on 1 January «http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?language=en&pcode=tps00001». 
73
 Germany, Statisches Bundesamt, op. cit., n. 69. 
74
 Government of Gibraltar Abstract of Statistics 2013 (2014) 
«https://www.gibraltar.gov.gi/new/images/stories/PDF/statistics/2014/Abstract_of_Statistics_2013.pdf ». 
75
 The last of these categories was in practice necessarily capped at the value of the highest reported DPA 
budget (€19.23M). 
76
 Namely, the Luxembourg, Gibraltar and Liechtenstein DPAs which had per capita reported budgets of €2.98, 
€4.20 and €16.05 respectively. 
18 
 
Table Three:  Reported Gross and Per Capita DPA Budgets 
Gross 
Budget 
 
Per Capita 
Budget  
<€0.5M ≥€0.5M to 
<€1.5M 
≥€1.5M to 
<€3.5M 
≥€3.5M to 
<€7.5M 
≥€7.5M to 
<€15.5M 
≥€15.5 (to 
<19.23M) 
Number 
(approx.
%) 
€ 0.1   Austria; 
Slovakia 
 Poland Italy  4 (14%) 
€0.2 Latvia Lithuania Greece; 
Hungary; 
Bulgaria 
   5 (17%) 
€0.3 Cyprus; 
Estonia 
 Portugal; 
Finland 
  France; UK 6 (21%) 
€0.4   Germany 
Rhineland-
Palatinate 
   1 (3%) 
€0.5  Slovenia Ireland Sweden; 
Belgium 
Netherlands  5 (17%) 
€0.6   Germany 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
Czech 
Republic 
  2 (7%) 
€0.7 Malta Germany 
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 
Germany 
Brandenburg 
   3 (10%) 
> €0.7 Gibraltar Liechtenstein Luxembourg    3 (10%) 
Number 
(approx. %) 
5 (17%) 6 (21%) 10 (34%) 4 (14%) 2 (7%) 2 (7%)  
 
ANALYSIS OF STANDARDIZED RETURNS 
 The results of the survey, summarized in Table One above, clearly indicate that most DPAs 
have adopted an expansive approach to the interpretation of data protection even in the area of online 
media expression.  Firstly, data protection was almost always seen to be applicable to all types of 
online media.  Thus, across all the online media actor scenarios, an average of only 7% of DPA 
responses considered the activity in question to be exempt (category a/0), with a minimum of 0% 
responses in this category in the case of both the social networking site (example 5) and street 
mapping (example 7) through to a maximum of only 16% in the case of the individual social 
networker (example 4)).  Secondly, notwithstanding its central role in the original legislative debate 
on the interface between data protection and public freedom of expression, DPAs also generally 
considered that the Article 9 special purposes derogation (category b/0.33) was not applicable to most 
forms of online media activity.  Indeed, only as regards the newspaper archive (example 1) was this 
category the modal one selected.  Moreover, as regards examples 3, 6 and 7, which concerned the 
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rating website, search engine and street mapping service respectively, no responses selected that 
category.  Thirdly, a significant group of DPAs did indicate that an ad hoc balancing of default data 
protection provisions with freedom of expression (category c/0.67) would be necessary as regards the 
individual blogger, rating website and individual social networker (examples 2, 3 and 5).  However, 
with the exception of the individual blogger, almost as many or more DPAs claimed that default data 
protection should simply apply in full (category d/1).   Meanwhile, this latter most stringent 
perspective was supported by the clear majority of DPAs in the case of the social networking site, 
search engine and street mapping service (examples 5 - 7).  This category was also the most selected 
one overall, a fact which helps explain the high average interpretation score of 0.75, a figure which 
highlights the theoretically constrained understanding of freedom of expression by DPAs here.  The 
stringent nature of the interpretative stance adopted may be linked to the symbolically central position 
data protection within European fundamental rights coupled with the role played these agencies as 
“guardian[s]”77 of this framework.  A stressing of data protection’s general importance may also help 
DPAs in their quest for better resourcing and “enhanced regulatory powers”.78 In sum, the European 
data protection system appears to have substantially attained a harmonization of the interpretation of 
data protection at the theoretically equivalent and high level of protection set out in Directive 95/46.
79
 
However, notwithstanding the increasing rhetorical focus on data protection as a fundamental 
right, the figures above on enforcement (Table Two), paint a starkly different picture regarding the 
practical reality of data protection as applied to online media expression.  Firstly, the most common 
DPA position in relation to all seven online media actors was to report no enforcement whatsoever 
(category a/0); moreover, this was the majority position in relation to all but street mapping (example 
7).  Secondly, overall, only 16% of responses indicated that enforcement action had been taken place 
both in the context of information obtained without proper authorization from another data controller 
and in another context connected to publication (category d/1); moreover, even the case-specific high 
                                                          
77
 Commission v Germany, op. cit, n. 11 at [23]. 
78
 Newman, op. cit., n. 5, p. 190. 
79
 Nevertheless, even here it should be noted that the survey results disclosed a range of standard deviations 
ranging from the very low figure of 0.09 in the case of street mapping services (example 7) to the fairly high 
value of 0.36 in the case of the individual on a social networking site (example 4).  This suggests that a diversity 
even of basic interpretative stance remains present as regards the applicability of data protection to individuals 
online. 
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here (which related to social networking sites (example 5)) was only 23%.   Thirdly, the overall 
average enforcement score registered was very low (0.31), with the bottom score (0.17) attributed to 
search engines (example 6)
80
 and the top (0.38) to street mapping services (example 7).
81
   Finally, a 
clear disparity of response across all the scenarios produced very high and stable standard deviations 
which at 0.39 averaged more than the overall enforcement score.
82
  These results contrast markedly 
with Epp’s finding in the comparative case of the United States that strong enforcement mechanisms 
had emerged in those policy areas which had become infused with “rights-based aspirations”.83  
However, development in this case rested not a European-style regulatory system but rather on a 
“decentralized, court-centred system of oversight”84 epitomized by the private class action.85 
 The generally low level of enforcement in Europe may be linked to the resourcing of the 
DPAs, which remains very limited whether measured on the basis of either the gross or per capita 
budget figures detailed above.  Personal information and its use is complex, ubiqutious and growing 
exponentially;
86
 moreover, many of the companies involved such as Facebook and Google have 
enormous financial clout.
87
   Given this, the reported average gross DPA budget of €3.4M and the per 
capita funding level of around €0.33 hardly appears commensurate with the weighty and important 
                                                          
80
 It is recognised that the particularly low figure here may reflect the fact that a number of DPAs were waiting 
for the Google Spain decision to be handed down before considering whether to take action (Google Spain, 
Google v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González (C-131/12) EU:C:2014:317). 
81
 Although, as specified above, it did not provide possible collect comprehensive data on enforcement activity 
through public available information readily available on DPA websites, the information which was collated 
also indicated very low levels of enforcement.  Indeed, vis-à-vis all the examples other than street mapping 
services, clear evidence of enforcement action was found only in relation to a handful of the DPAs in each case. 
82
 It may be hypothesized that, as regards the different online media actors, we should expect a significant and 
positive relationship between the average interpretation score and the average enforcement score.  Correlative 
analysis does not support this, however, as the Spearman’s rank is 0.09 with a two-tailed significance value of 
0.848. 
83
 C. Epp, Making Rights Real:  Activists, Bureaucrats, and the Creation of the Legalistic State (2010), p. 288 
84
 Id., p. 288. 
85
 Of course, the United States has also refused to endorse the conception of data protection as a fundamental 
right, a reality which has led to increasing tension with Europe which reached a partial dénouement in Schrems v 
Data Protection Commissioner (C-518/07) EU:C:2016:650. 
86
 Thus, Floridi cites evidence that “between 2006 and 2010 the global quantity of digital data will have 
increased more than six-fold, from 161 exabytes to 988 exabytes” (p. 6) arguing further that the resulting 
“infosphere is progressively absorbing any other space” (L. Floridi, Information:  A Very Short Introduction 
(2010), p. 16). 
87
 Google reported a 2013 turnover of $15.7bn whilst Facebook’s turnover was $7.87bn which, using average 
2013 figures provided by Eurostat, translates into €20.85bn and €10.45bn respectively (see Google ʻGoogle Inc 
Announces Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2013 Resultsʼ (2014) 
«https://investor.google.com/earnings/2013/Q4_google_earnings.html»). 
D. Rusche ʻFacebook posts record quarterly results and reports $1.5bn profit for 2013ʼ  (2014) Guardian Online 
«http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jan/29/facebook-record-quarterly-results»). 
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tasks regulators have allocated to them.  Nevertheless, it is also clear that there are significant 
differences in DPA resourcing levels, with some DPAs being several times better funded than others, 
whether measured on a gross or per capita basis.  Whether these or other contrasts can help explain 
the divergences in reported enforcement of data protection vis-à-vis the online media will be analysed 
in the next section. 
 
EXPLORING DIVERGENCES IN DPAS’ REPORTED ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY 
The survey results clearly indicated that reported enforcement vis-à-vis online media 
expression differed substantially between the DPAs.  At the most basic level, it is possible to measure 
this simply by producing a count of the number of types of specified online media actor that each 
DPA reported it had taken at least some enforcement action against.  A more detailed picture, which 
factors in the type of enforcement registered, is obtained by calculating an enforcement score for each 
DPA as an average of the categorical enforcement values it reported in relation to all seven online 
media actors.  Table Four below orders DPAs according to their enforcement count and also details 
their enforcement score.   Based on a similar justification to that outlined above as regards DPA 
resourcing, namely the essentially non-existent jurisdiction of both the German federal DPA and the 
Spanish Catalan DPA vis-à-vis the private sector as a result of the federal division of powers, these 
two agencies are excluded from this table and also from the rest of the analysis in this section.
88
   As 
can be seen, whilst approximately 10% of the DPAs reported enforcement action against all seven 
types of online media actor, almost a quarter indicated no enforcement whatsoever.  The enforcement 
count figures also differed widely (from 0 to 0.81) and the relationship between the two variables was 
extremely strong.
89
 
Table Four:  DPA Reported Enforcement Against Specified Online Media Actors (n=29) 
                                                          
88
 For completeness, it should be noted that, whilst the German federal DPA reported no enforcement activity, 
the Spanish Catalan DPA did indicate that it had carried out enforcement in relation to a news archive and a 
blogger both as regards material obtained without proper authorization from another data controller and 
otherwise. 
89
  The (non-parametric) Spearman’s rank correlation is 0.964 with a two-tailed significance value of 0.00.  
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Enforcement 
Count 
Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) (Enforcement Score) Number 
(approx. %) 
Seven Belgium (0.81), Finland (0.62), Hungary (0.67) 3 (10%) 
Six Austria (0.57), Lithuania (0.76), Slovenia (0.72) 3 (10%) 
Five Czech (0.62), Estonia (0.71), France (0.48), Latvia (0.38) 4 (14%) 
Four German Schleswig-Holstein (0.57), Netherlands (0.57) 2 (7%) 
Three Germany Rhineland-Palatinate (0.29), Italy (0.33), Luxembourg (0.24), Poland (0.14) 4 (14%) 
Two Cyprus (0.19), Greece (0.29), Sweden (0.19) 3 (10%) 
One Bulgaria (0.1), German Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (0.1), Portugal (0.1) 3 (10%) 
Zero German Brandenburg (0), Gibraltar (0), Ireland (0), Liechtenstein (0), Malta (0), 
Slovakia (0), United Kingdom (0) 
7 (24%) 
 
 Even aside from the federal jurisdictional issues which confront DPAs in Germany and Spain, 
there are a multitude of reasons why a DPA in one jurisdiction may take enforcement action against a 
particular type of online media actor whilst another DPA does not.  For example, some actors may be 
present in one jurisdiction but not the other.  Moreover, even if the actor is present in both, if its 
activity falls within article 9 special purposes as defined in national law then, notwithstanding the 
contrary steer in article 9 and recital 37 of Directive 95/46, a DPA may find that all possibility for it to 
engage in substantive enforcement has have been removed under local legislation.
90
   However, 
notwithstanding the potential validity of these rationales in specific contexts, they should not play a 
significant role in structuring global divergences between the DPAs.  The online media actors 
included in the survey are all well-established and ubiquitous.  Therefore, whilst a few of these actors 
(for example, street mapping services) may indeed not be present in a few EEA jurisdictions, the great 
majority (from news archives to bloggers to social networkers) are present in all of them.  Moreover, 
given that, as explicated above, the great majority of DPAs explicitly consider the special purposes 
derogation to be inapplicable as regards most forms of online media activity, formal differences in the 
legal regulation or national scope of such purposes should also only exercise a marginal overall effect. 
 In contrast, we might credibly expect differences, firstly, in the level of financial resourcing 
of the DPAs and, secondly, in the stringency of their own interpretative stance to drive divergence in 
reported enforcement documented above.   Turning first to resourcing, it can be hypothesized that the 
capacity of a DPA to undertake various types of enforcement action against online media depends 
                                                          
90
 For an analysis of the very significant substantive divergences here see D. Erdos, ““European Data Protection 
and Media Expression:  Fundamentally Off Balance” (2016) 65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
139. 
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both on the overall level of its funding and on how well it is funded on a per capita basis.  Thus, a 
very small DPA, even if well-funded on a per capita/head of resident population basis, may still not be 
able to mount a credible challenge to a large social networking site or search engine.  Similarly, a 
DPA with a sizable gross budget but minimal per capita resources may be so over-burdened by a wide 
range of individual data concerns that it is unable to engage in the kind of complex and strategic 
action often required in the online media context.  To test this hypothesis, a combined measure of 
DPA financial resourcing was created based on both the gross and per capita budget figures.
91
  This 
measure was constructed by transposing both sets of data on to a linear scale where 1 represented the 
resources available to the DPA best funded on the relevant basis and all the other figures were 
expressed in terms of a proportion of this.  For each DPA, an average was then taken of both of these 
two transposed scores (see the appendix for the combined average scores).  Reflecting the non-
parametric nature of the data, Table Five overleaf details a Spearman’s rank correlation between this 
combined budget measure and both DPAs’ online media actor enforcement count and their online 
media average data protection enforcement score.   The same correlations are also presented using 
both the gross and per capita budget figures.  As can be seen, as regards both the combined and the 
per capita budget measures, the results are not only insignificant but also opposite to the expected 
direction.
92
  Meanwhile, although the results for the gross budget measure are in the right direction, 
the correlations are not only extremely small but manifestly insignificant.  Although it is recognised 
that these budget figures focus on one period in time, whilst the enforcement figures relate to a longer 
time period, the complete lack of any significant positive relationship suggests that (notwithstanding 
an overwhelming regulatory consensus that online media expression generally strongly engages data 
protection) better resourcing of DPAs does not by itself lead to extensive enforcement activity being 
undertaken against new media actors. 
                                                          
91
 As previously noted above, in the case of the German Länder DPAs all these measures had been adjusted in 
order to reallocate a portion of the national German DPA budget to them pro-rated on the basis of their 
population size within Germany, thus creating a measure of the resources available in the relevant geographical 
jurisdiction for regulating data protection in both the private and public sector.  Since the German federal DPA 
had reported no enforcement activity as regards the new media, the response from each German Länder DPA in 
effect also represented the combined enforcement efforts specific to that particular jurisdiction. 
92
 This counterintuitive result may have been influenced by the fact that DPAs serving micro jurisdictions 
generally have very disproportionately large per capita budgets. 
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 In order to investigate a possible relationship between the stringency of a DPA’s 
interpretative stance and its enforcement track-record, it was necessary to compute an interpretation 
score for each DPA as an average of the interpretation values registered for all seven online media 
actors.  Creation of such an average was complicated by the fact that a large proportion of DPAs 
provided an answer here in free-text form.  In order to accommodate this, quasi-standardized answers 
were imputed from an analysis of this free-text answer (or in two cases where the free-text answer had 
no substantive content, from the answer provided by the overwhelming majority of the other DPAs).
93
   
This process allowed for an interpretation score to be calculated for all but two of the responding 
DPAs.
94
   Table Five below also provides details of a Spearman rank correlation run between these 
interpretation scores, the DPAs’ enforcement count and their enforcement score.  As can be seen, in 
clear contrast to the financial resourcing figures, there is evidence of a strongly positive and 
significant correlation between a DPA’s interpretative score and its likelihood of having reported 
undertaking various form of enforcement action in this area.  In other words, those DPAs with an 
interpretative stance even more stringent than the generally expansive approach adopted by the vast of 
majority of EU DPAs were likely to have adopted an active enforcement stance as regards online 
media expression, whilst those with a less stringent approach than the average were very unlikely to 
have done so.
95
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 In the case of the Slovenian DPA, the free-text responses were found to relate equally to categories a/0 and 
d/1.  As a result, an average was taken of these, resulting in a unique score of 0.5.  A full analysis of these free-
text responses and the process of quasi-standard answer imputation is provided in D. Erdos, “Data Protection 
Confronts Freedom of Expression on the ʻNew Mediaʼ Internet:  The Stance of European Regulatory 
Authorities” (2015) 40 European Law Review 531.  The results used are also set out in the appendix to this 
article. 
94
 The UK DPA did not provide any answer to the interpretative questions and, therefore, obviously could not be 
included.  The Netherlands DPA only provided an answer to two out of the seven online media examples and 
therefore similarly failed to provide enough data to impute a comprehensive score. 
95
 Spearman’s rank correlations were also performed using street mapping enforcement data gathered from DPA 
websites. This confirmed a strong association between such enforcement and the DPA’s interpretation score 
(coefficient0.489, significance:  0.015) and the lack of any association of two-tailed significance between 
enforcement and either the combined and per capita budget measures (coefficients 0.316 and -0.234 and 
significance 0.124 and 0.260 respectively).  At the same time, it also suggested a clearly positive association 
between this enforcement action and the gross budget measure (coefficient:  0.524; significance:  0.007).  This 
last result, however, needs to be treated with great circumspection since it is apparent that Google Street View is 
not present in many of the smaller jurisdictions (which naturally have lower gross budgets) such as Cyprus, 
Liechtenstein and Malta.  These DPAs have, therefore, not had significant opportunities to enforce in this area, a 
fact which explains why they all reported no enforcement action. 
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Table Five:  Spearman Rank Correlations (and Two-Tailed Significance Tests) between DPA 
Enforcement, Resourcing and Interpretative Measures 
 Enforcement Count Enforcement Score 
DPA Resourcing (n=29)   
Combined Budget Measure Coefficient: - 0.169 
Significance:  0.380 
Coefficient: - 0.176 
Significance:  0.362 
Gross Budget Measure Coefficient: 0.108 
Significance:  0.576 
Coefficient: 0.100 
Significance:  0.606 
Per Capita Budget Measure Coefficient: - 0.307 
Significance:  0.105 
Coefficient: - 0.247 
Significance:  0.197 
DPA Interpretative Stance (n=27)   
Interpretation Score Coefficient: 0.442* 
Significance:  0.021 
Coefficient: 0.489** 
Significance:  0.010 
* = significant at 0.05 level.  
** = significant at the 0.01 level 
  
Finally, it may be argued that, given that the survey explored enforcement since the 
transposition of Directive 95/46, it might be appropriate to augment both the enforcement count and 
the enforcement score of those DPAs operating in Eastern Europe jurisdictions together with Cyprus 
and Malta which only became members of the EU and subject to the Directive long after 24 October 
1998, the date when transposition was required within the EU.
96
  Such an augmentation can be 
achieved by adjusting these figures to reflect the fact that, whilst the survey generally probed some 
14½ years of potential enforcement, Bulgaria only joined the EU on 1 May 2005 and therefore ‘lost’ 
approximately 8 years of potential enforcement (55% of the total period), whilst the other jurisdictions 
joined on 1 May 2005 and therefore similarly ‘lost’ approximately 5½ years (38% of the total 
period).
97
   Such an adjustment, however, makes no significant difference to the results reported 
above.  The correlations with DPA financial resourcing remain not only insignificant but often in the 
unexpected direction.  In contrast, the correlations between the average data protection interpretation 
                                                          
96
 Directive 95/46, art. 32 (1).  As an EU-associated EEA state, Liechtenstein only became subject to the 
Directive on 26 June 1999 (see op. cit., n. 8).  However, this seven-month gap was considered too small to have 
a significant effect on these results and so no adjustment was made here. 
97
 In sum, both Bulgarian DPA’s enforcement count and its enforcement score was multiplied by 1 plus 0.55 
(representing the ‘lost’ years).  The scores of the other Eastern European jurisdictions, together with that of 
Cyprus and Malta, were similarly multiplied by 1 plus 0.38.  
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score and both the adjusted enforcement count
98
 and the adjusted enforcement score
99
 remain both 
strong and significant. 
 In sum, although the great majority of DPAs have coalesced on a theoretically onerous 
interpretative stance vis-à-vis online media expression, most have failed to engage in extensive 
enforcement in this area.  Whilst the generally low level of reported enforcement may be linked to the 
limited resources of these agencies, the serious divergences between them appear related not to this 
factor but rather to continued disparity in the severity of their interpretative stance.  Moving from a 
symbolically onerous interpretation into active enforcement in an area such as online media 
expression may require taking on powerful interests and result in negative publicity.  To take the most 
high profile example, the action by the Spanish DPA to secure a right of erasure on search engines 
which led to the landmark Google Spain decision required not only confronting an internet behemoth 
but also publicity decrying the authority’s stance as “akin to marching into a library and forcing it to 
pulp books”.100 In general, it appears that only DPAs with a particularly strong ideological 
commitment to data protection are likely to prove willing to take on such risks across the online media 
space.  A focus on the often largely paper-based system of “networked governance”101 achieved 
within the Article 29 Working Party may, therefore, overemphasise the level of convergence and 
effectiveness which has practically been achieved within European data protection.  This is 
problematic since such qualities are clearly integral to a well-functioning regime. 
 
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 
 After several years of negotiation, the EU has now agreed a new General Data Protection 
Regulation which will replace the existing Directive in 2018.
102
   Substantively, this Regulation 
                                                          
98
 The Spearman’s rho became 0.423 with a two-tailed significance value of 0.028. 
99
 The Spearman’s rho became 0.481 with a two-tailed significance value of 0.011. 
100
 Index on Censorship Index blasts EU court ruling on “right to be forgotten” (2014) 
«https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/05/index-blasts-eu-court-ruling-right-forgotten». 
101
 Newman, op. cit., n. 5, p 182. 
102
 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 99 (2). 
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significantly augments the already stringent European approach including through an expanded list of 
data principles,
103
 much more onerous requirements to ensure transparency for data subjects
104
 and far 
more rule-based discipline mechanisms such as detailed requirements to notify many types of data 
breaches to a DPA and sometimes even data subjects themselves.
105
  This new instrument also places 
considerably greater formal emphasis on enforcement and harmonization.   Thus, at least outside the 
special expressive purposes the pan-European governance of which remains largely unaltered,
106
 
DPAs are to be empowered to issue administrative fines for breaches of most aspects of the regime of 
up to either €10M or €20M or in the case of commercial undertakings up to either 2% or 4% of annual 
worldwide turnover if this is higher.
107
   It is also stated that each DPA must be provided with the 
“human, technical and financial resources, premises and infrastructure necessary for the effective 
performance of its tasks and exercise of its powers”.108  As regards cross-border processing,109 the 
Regulation sets out rules for ensuring that one lead DPA be appointed to coordinate all matters 
relating to the enforcement of the law.
110
  At the same time, a consistency mechanism is established 
whereby other DPAs or the Commission may require that the European Data Protection Board (a 
reconstituted and greatly enhanced continuation of the Article 29 Working Party) issue an Opinion 
which the lead DPA must either follow
111
 or face an ultimately binding Decision being issued against 
it by the same body.
112
  The Regulation also clarifies that the right to individual compensation 
incorporates a notion of joint and several liability, that it relates to both material and immaterial 
damage and that, as regards private controllers, data subjects may bring proceedings wherever they 
have their habitual residence.
113
  Finally, whilst many provisions will still allow for derogations 
                                                          
103
 Regulation 2016/679, art. 5. 
104
 Regulation 2016/679, arts. 12-15. 
105
 Id., arts. 33-34. 
106
 Id., art. 85 (2). 
107
 Id., art. 83.  Due to the peculiarities of their legal system, in Denmark and Estonia special procedures will 
apply such that fines will be initiated by a DPA but imposed by the courts.  See Id., recital 151 and art. 79 (9). 
108
 Id., art. 52 (4). 
109
 Id., art. 4 (23). 
110
 Id., arts 4 (16) and 56. 
111
 Id., art. 64. 
112
 Id., art. 65. 
113
 Id., arts 82 and 79 (2). 
28 
 
specific to each Member State,
114
 the directly applicable nature of a regulation means that (potentially 
divergent) transposition at national level will not in general be necessary. 
 Despite this, experience under the existing law may lead one to question whether the 
Regulation will in practice prove adequate to the challenges elucidated above.  Even under Directive 
95/46, Member States are required to adopt measures and sanctions “to ensure the full 
implementation”115 of data protection and the great majority have instituted not just wide-ranging 
administrative sanctions but also criminal provisions (which often carry a maximum penalty of 
several years imprisonment).
116
  As regards private compensation, the Directive is already clear that a 
controller will be presumed liable unless “he proves that he is not responsible for the event giving rise 
to the damage”.117  The Directive also not only sets out the wide-ranging obligations of DPAs to hear 
claims from data subjects, undertake checks on the legality of processing and monitor the application 
of the law
118
 but further states both that these independent DPAs “must have the necessary means to 
perform their duties”119 and that they “shall cooperate within one another to the extent necessary for 
the performance of their duties”.120  In principle, these formalities have been reinforced by Court of 
Justice jurisprudence which has stressed inter alia that such provisions must be interpreted 
purposively “to ensure the effectiveness and reliability of the supervision of compliance” with data 
protection.
121
  However, such strictures have not prevented the emergence of the very partial and 
fissiparous enforcement reality as elaborated in this article.  Such an outcome may instead be related, 
in a general sense, to a considerable mismatch between Europe’s stringent data protection standards 
and the very limited resources of the DPAs and, more specifically, to a culture within a large number 
of DPAs where “enforcement actions [especially in controversial areas] have a rather low priority”.122 
                                                          
114
 As well as art. 85 noted above see especially art. 23 (restrictions) and art. 9(2)(6) (derogations from the ban 
on processing sensitive or special categories of data). 
115
 Directive 95/46, art. 24. 
116
 European Union, Agency for Fundamental Rights, op. cit., n. 9. 
117
 Directive 95/46, art. 23 (2). 
118
 Id., art. 28. 
119
 Id., recital 63. 
120
 Id., art. 28 (6). 
121
 Commission v Germany, op. cit., n. 11 at [41]. 
122
 European Commission, ʻFirst Report on the Implementation of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC)ʼ 
(20013) (COM (2003) 265 final), 12. 
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 Reflecting these experiences back on to the text of the Regulation, it is clear that even the new 
wording on the resourcing of DPAs remains vague, a reality which, at least initially, may result in 
only a limited change in national practice.  Moreover, whilst individual private remedies are 
somewhat enhanced, the Regulation stops short of mandating representative class action (absent the 
individual mandate of each data subject).
123
  On the other hand, compared to the rather general 
provisions in the Directive, the presence in the Regulation of both new DPA powers to fine up to 
extremely high levels and a detailed consistency mechanism which can be triggered in cross-border 
situations, could shift practice over time towards both greater and more harmonized enforcement.  
Nevertheless, the latter mechanism may prove so cumbersome and burdensome to operate that, aside 
from particularly large-scale and high-profile areas, considerable discretion will in practice be 
retained in hands of local DPAs.  Thus, absent urgency, the Board may take up to eight weeks 
(extendable in complex cases by a further six) even to issue an initial Opinion,
124
 the local lead DPA 
will then have two weeks to respond
125
 and a further month (potentially extendable by another month) 
will be allowed for the Board to issue, by a two-thirds majority, any necessary binding Decision (art 
65 (2))
 126
 which the lead DPA will have a further month to start implementing.
127
 Moreover, 
especially given that the resourcing needs of the central Board are not explicitly addressed in the 
Regulation,
128
 it is far from clear that this body will have the capacity to administer this mechanism on 
a large scale even if called to do so.  Indeed, it has been argued that ensuring true effectiveness here 
“seems to presuppose some kind of EU data police who are active in all countries – something which 
is only conceivable far into the future”.129  Finally, in responding at a substantive level with “more 
law, and specifically more-of-the-same law”, the Regulation risks exacerbating rather than 
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 See Regulation 2016/679, art. 80. 
124
 Id., art. 64 (3). 
125
 Id., art. 64 (7). 
126
 Id., at. 65 (2).  If such a majority can still not be obtained even after the expiry of such a period, then the 
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127
 Id., art. 65 (6). 
128
 The only relevant provision is article 75 (1) which simply states that the European Data Protection 
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 P. Blume, ʻThe myths pertaining to the proposed General Data Protection Regulationʼ (2014) 4 International 
Data Privacy Law 269, 272. 
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ameliorating the “regulatory disconnection between data protection law and data-processing 
practice”.130  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Principally as a result of Directive 95/46 and more recently through its recognition in both the 
EU Charter and treaties, Europe has committed itself to far-reaching data protection laws supervised 
by statutory regulators who cooperate within the Article 29 Working Party system.  This framework 
has potentially serious implications for the increasingly ubiquitous phenomena of online media 
publication.   In light of this, a comprehensive survey of EEA DPAs explored the interface between 
European data protection and the publication activities of seven ubiquitous types of online media 
actor.  This survey demonstrated that these DPAs overwhelmingly consider data protection norms to 
be strongly engaged by online media expression, thereby concomitantly adopting a generally 
constrained understanding of freedom of expression.  In contrast to this common stringent 
interpretative stance, enforcement has been both limited and uneven.   Whilst the generally low level 
of enforcement may be related to a severe disparity between the stringency of the law and the meagre 
financial resources of these agencies, divergences between appear related rather to continuing 
discrepancies in their interpretative stance.  In sum, only DPAs with a particularly stringent 
interpretative stance are likely to have engaged in extensive enforcement activity. 
 The theoretically stringent interpretative stance of DPAs may be linked to centrality of data 
protection within the maturing area of European fundamental rights coupled with their role both 
nationally and in pan-European forums as the guardians of this framework.
131
  Nevertheless, as the 
Google Spain decision epitomised, moving beyond such theory into active enforcement often requires 
taking on powerful interests and exposure to negative publicity.  Only those DPAs with a particularly 
strong ideological commitment to data protection appear willing to that those risks.  A focus on pan-
                                                          
130
 B. Koops, ʻThe Trouble with European Data Protection Lawʼ (2014) 3 International Data Privacy Law 250, 
256. 
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 G. Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU (2014); O. 
Lynskey, ʻDeconstructing Data Protection:  The “Added-Value” of a Right to Data Protection in the EU Legal 
Order” (2014) 63 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 569. 
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European processes of ʻnetworked governanceʼ within the Working Party has tended to obscure the 
resulting lack of practical effectiveness and equivalence within this regulatory regime. 
 Whilst the new General Data Protection Regulation is predicated on an acknowledgement of 
some of these deficiencies, questions remain as to whether it will in practice adequately confront these 
challenges.  To be properly effective, it is essential that Member States ensure both that their local 
DPAs are resourced appropriately and that the European Data Protection Board is given the funding 
and institutional support necessary to perform its complex new enforcement functions.  Finally, more 
work must be done to develop common legal interpretations which, whilst faithful to the protective 
ambitions of the law, also both take fully in to account other competing rights and link effectively to a 
credible enforcement strategy.  Although such outcomes will likely prove difficult to achieve, 
anything less will fail to provide Europe with the robust, legally certain and effective data protection 
regime which it claims to value so highly.
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Appendix:  Quantitative EEA DPA Data on Interpretation (Int.), Enforcement (Enf.) and Resourcing 
 
EEA DPA 
Geographic 
Jurisdiction 
 
 
(1) 
Newspaper 
Archive 
(2) 
Individual 
Blogger 
 
(3) 
Internet 
Rating 
Website 
(4) 
Individual on 
SNS 
(5) 
Social 
Networking 
Site (SNS) 
(6)  
Internet 
Search 
Engine 
(7)  
Street 
Mapping 
Service 
Average 
Scores Enf. 
Count 
 
 
DPA 
Website 
Data On 
Street 
Mapping Annual Budget 
Int. Enf. Int. Enf. Int. Enf. Int. Enf. Int. Enf. Int. Enf. Int. Enf. Int. Enf. 
Service 
Enf. Gross 
€M 
Per 
Capita 
€ 
Combined 
Scale 
Austria 0.33 0 0.67 0.67 1 0.67 1 0.67 1 0.67 1 0.67 1 0.67 0.86 0.57 6 1 1.20 0.14 0.04 
Belgium 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 0.67 0.67 1 1 0.81 0.81 7 1 5.80 0.52 0.17 
Bulgaria 0.33 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.67 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.62 0.10 1 0 (1.51) 0.21 0.05 
Cyprus 1 0.67 1 0.67 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.67 0 1 0 0.95 0.19 2 0 0.26 0.30 0.02 
Czech Republic 0.67 0 0.67 1 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 (1) 0 1 0.67 0.90 0.62 5 0.67 6.30 0.60 0.18 
Estonia 0.33 1 0.33 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.81 0.71 5 0 0.38 0.29 0.02 
Finland 0 0.33 0.33 1 0.67 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 0.33 1 0.33 0.57 0.62 7 0.67 1.80 0.33 0.06 
France 0.33 0.33 0.67 0 1 0.67 1 0 1 0.67 1 0.67 1 1 0.86 0.48 5 1 17.2 0.26 0.46 
Germany 
Federal 0.33 [0] 0.67 [0] 0.67 [0] 0.67 [0] 0.67 [0] 1 [0] 1 [0] 0.71 - - - - - - 
Germany 
Brandenburg 0.33 0 0.33 0 0.67 0 0.33 0 0.33 0 1 0 1 0 0.57 0 0 - 1.86 0.65 0.07 
Germany 
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 0.33 0 0.67 0 0 0 1 0.67 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.71 0.10 1 - 1.27 0.69 0.05 
Germany 
Rhineland-
Palatinate 0 0 0.33 0.67 0.67 0 0.67 0 0.67 0.67 1 0 1 0.67 0.62 0.29 3 - 1.92 0.38 0.06 
Germany 
Schleswig-
Holstein 0.33 0 0.67 0.67 0.67 0 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 0.67 0.81 0.57 4 - 2.00 0.60 0.07 
Gibraltar 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.71 0 0 0 (0.15) 4.95 0.16 
Greece 0.67 1 0.67 0 0.67 0 0.67 0 0.67 0 1 0 1 1 0.76 0.29 2 0.67 1.82 0.17 0.05 
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EEA DPA 
 
 
 
(1) 
Newspaper 
Archive 
(2) 
Individual 
Blogger 
 
(3)  
Internet 
Rating 
Website 
(4) 
Individual 
on SNS 
(5) 
Social 
Networking 
Site (SNS) 
(6)  
Internet 
Search 
Engine 
(7)  
Street 
Mapping 
Service 
Average 
Scores Enf. 
Count 
 
 
DPA 
Website 
Data On  
Street 
Mapping Annual Budget 
Int. Enf. Int. Enf. Int. Enf. Int. Enf. Int. Enf. Int. Enf. Int. Enf. Int. Enf. 
Service 
Enf. Gross 
€M 
Per 
Capita 
€ 
Combined 
Scale 
Hungary 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 1 0.67 1 0.67 1 0.67 1 0.67 0.81 0.67 7 0.67 (1.61) 0.16 0.05 
Ireland 0 0 0.67 0 0.67 0 0.67 0 0.67 0 0 0 0.67 0 0.48 0 0 0 2.20 0.48 0.07 
Italy 0.67 1 0.33 0.67 0.67 0 0.67 0 0.67 0 1 0 1 0.67 0.71 0.33 3 1 (8.50) 0.14 0.23 
Latvia 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 0 1 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.67 0 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.38 5 0 0.39 0.19 0.02 
Liechtenstein 0.67 0 0.67 0 0.67 0 0.67 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.67 0 0 0 0.60 16.17 0.52 
Lithuania 0.67 1 0.67 1 0.67 1 0.67 1 0.67 1 1 0.33 1 0 0.76 0.76 6 0.67 0.55 0.19 0.02 
Luxembourg 0.67 0.33 0.67 0 1 0 1 0.67 1 0 1 0 1 0.67 0.90 0.24 3 1 1.60 2.98 0.13 
Malta 0.33 0 0.33 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.67 0 0 0 0.28 0.65 0.03 
Netherlands 
 
0 
 
0 1 1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 1 1 
 
0.57 4 0.33 7.50 0.45 0.21 
Poland 0.33 0 0.67 0 0.67 0.33 0 0 1 0.33 1 0 1 0.33 0.67 0.14 3 0.67 (3.57) 0.09 0.10 
Portugal 0.67 0 0.67 0 0.67 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.67 0.86 0.10 1 0.67 2.70 0.26 0.08 
Slovakia 0.33 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.48 0 0 0 0.66 0.12 0.02 
Slovenia 0.50 1 0.50 1 1 0.67 0 0.67 1 0.67 1 0 1 1 0.71 0.71 6 0.67 0.93 0.45 0.04 
Spain - 
Catalonia 0.67 [1] 0.67 [1] 0.67 [0] 0.67 [0] 1 [0] 1 [0] 1 [0] 0.81 - - 0 - - - 
Sweden 0 0 0.33 0.67 1 0.67 0.67 0 0.67 0 0 0 0.67 0 0.48 0.19 2 0 (4.92) 0.52 0.14 
UK - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 0 0.33 (19.23) 0.30 0.51 
Appendix Notes:  Values which are underlined are imputed; those which are italicized are based on DPA estimates and those in brackets have been converted to Euros from 
a local currency (which was preferred to any Euro estimate provided with the exception of Latvia where no Eurostat figure could be found for the required conversion from 
Lats).  The figures in square brackets from the German national and Spanish Catalan DPAs are excluded from the summations due to comparability concerns arising from 
federalism.  For similar reasons, the German Länder DPA budget figures are augmented by a notional portion of the German federal DPAs based on their population ratios 
within Germany.  All these figures are rounded to nearest €0.00M. 
